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"MEET THE NEW Boss": THE NEW JUDICIAL CENTER
MARK TUSHNET"

A document entitled Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation
published in 1988 by the Reagan era Department of Justice is the
springboard for Professor Tushnet's discussion of the Supreme
Court's "new center." The Guidelines urged Department of Justice
litigators to foster a nearly exclusive reliance on original
understanding in constitutional interpretation and to resort to
legislative history only as a last resort. The Guidelines also advised
Department of Justice litigators to seek substantive legal changes
including more restrictive standing requirements, an end to the
creation of unenumerated individual rights, greater constitutional
protection of property rights, and greater limits on congressional
The discussion begins by viewing the Guidelines'
power.
characterization of Supreme Court jurisprudence as an indication
of the Court's "old center." The discussion then examines the
Court's subsequent development to reach an understanding of the
Court's "new center." Professor Tushnet finds that although the
Court at times seemed to entertain some views espoused by the
Guidelines, the present Court'scenter is remarkably like the Court's
center in 1988. Originalunderstandingremains only one method of
constitutional interpretation-not even the most important oneand legislative history continues to play a role in statutory
interpretation. Furthermore, changes in Court's jurisprudence
involving standing, unenumerated rights, and congressional power
remain limited (though there appear to be greater constitutional
protections of property rights). The only notable difference is that
the present Court has developed doctrines that could swing
constitutional interpretation toward the approach taken by the
Guidelines should newly appointed Justices want to endorse that
approach. But for now the current Court is much the same as
before.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1988 the Office of Legal Policy in the Department of Justice
published a document, Guidelines on ConstitutionalLitigation,1 which
identified what then Attorney General Edwin Meese regarded as the
principal issues of interpretation on which the Department's litigators
should focus.2 The Department of Justice policymakers wanted to
reinvigorate constitutional interpretation based (nearly exclusively)
on "original understanding." 3 They also believed that legislative
history should be used in statutory interpretation only when no other
methods of interpretation resolved interpretive ambiguity. 4 In
addition, the Guidelines suggested that the Department of Justice
seek new rulings in a wide range of substantive areas.'
As Professor Dawn Johnsen has suggested, the Guidelines can be
taken as a roadmap indicating the areas of constitutional law where,
as the Reagan Department of Justice saw things, the practice of
1. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1988) (Sup. Docs. No. J1.8/2:C76/4) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES].
2. Edwin Meese III, Preface to OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1988) ("The primary purpose of these
Guidelines is to help government litigators think clearly about issues of constitutional and
statutory interpretation that arise in the course of their litigation.").
3. See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 3 (citing Robert Bork, The Constitution,
Original Intent and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 824 (1986)). The
Guidelines used the terms "original understanding" and "original meaning" rather than
"original intent," arguing that the term "intent" might misleadingly focus on the subjective
understandings of the Constitution's drafters, whereas the other terms focused attention
on how the Constitution's words were understood by the public that ratified them. See id.
at 3-4 ("[T]he aim of any extratextual analysis is only to elucidate the meaning of the
actual constitutional text at issue."). This distinction, while important as a matter of
constitutional theory, has never played any role in Supreme Court decisions. The term
"original intent" was more widely used when the Guidelines were written, but the
alternative "original understanding" has become more common recently, and I use the
latter term throughout this Article.
4. Id. at 99 (providing as the fourth and final guideline on statutory interpretation,
"if an appeal to legislative history is necessary, legislative history can be used only to give
meaning to the words found in the statute").
5. Id. passim.
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constitutional interpretation-primarily by the Supreme Court-had
diverged from the Constitution's true meaning.6 I want to use the
Guidelines to explore what the "new center" on the Supreme Court
is, by first taking the document's identification of what had gone
wrong as equally an identification of the Court's "old center," and
then comparing where the present Court is with respect to those
issues to define the Court's "new center." I argue that the Court has
actually moved only a small distance away from its "old center" on
most of the issues the Guidelines identified, although the Court now
has available doctrines that could be invoked were new Justices
interested in substantially transforming the constitutional landscape.
For convenience, I divide the document's concerns into two not
entirely distinct classes: method and substance. What position has
the Supreme Court taken on the issues of method-using original
understanding and ignoring legislative history? First, the Court has
not relied exclusively on original understanding. Instead, the Court
has-as it always has done-included original understanding as one
of the sources of constitutional interpretation, but not as one having a
particularly privileged place in interpretation. Second, after a brief
period in which the Court abjured reliance on legislative history, it
has reverted to its historic practice of using legislative history when
doing so helps resolve statutory ambiguity.
I do not intend to survey the entire range of substantive issues
discussed in the Guidelines. I consider only issues relating to
standing, the enforcement of unenumerated individual rights,
constitutional protections of property rights,7 and the scope of
congressional power. In each of these areas the pattern is the same:
early modest successes in moving away from the then-existing center,
with doctrinal formulations that held out the prospect of more
substantial transformations, followed by decisions halting the
movement.8 The doctrinal formulations the Court devised, which
6. Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional
Power: PresidentialInfluences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 389-93 (2000)

(describing the origin and scope of the Guidelines).
7. The Guidelines did not discuss property rights generally, largely, I believe,
because the national government's regulatory interests conflict with strong constitutional
protections for property rights.
8. The Guidelines expressed general hostility to the development of a federal
common law. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 62-67. They did not focus specifically on the
Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), which in the next decade became the focal point of concern
among conservatives about federal common law. The Supreme Court has now held that
the ATS authorizes the federal courts to develop a common law of torts which violate
customary international law, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765 (2004), and to
that extent has not followed the tenor of the Guidelines. I note, though, that at least one
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have been neither repudiated nor extended, remain available for use
by a future Court inclined to change the center's location, but the
Court as constituted today seems happy to confine doctrines
embodying larger transformative projects to a relatively narrow
domain.
I. METHOD

There is nothing unusual about invoking original understanding
in constitutional interpretation. Justice Hugo Black was a strict
textualist.9
Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion in Powell v.
McCormack" discussed the case of John Wilkes and its impact on the
debates in the Constitutional Convention and the ratification process,
and gave a prominent rhetorical role to Alexander Hamilton's
statement to the New York ratifying convention of the fundamental
principle "that the people should choose whom they please to govern
them."'" The only interesting analytic issue raised by the Guidelines
is whether constitutional interpretation should be based solely on
alternatively, original
or whether,
original understanding,
understanding is merely one of several tools of interpretation.
The contemporary Supreme Court has clearly chosen not to rely
Some cases give originalist
solely on original understanding.
approaches a larger role than others." Few, if any, pay no attention
to other interpretive approaches and many ignore originalist
approaches altogether. 3 Indeed, the failure of originalism to take
of the Guidelines' statements might be read to approve of the use of customary
international law in cases involving the ATS. See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 66
(asserting that the Supreme Court has approved the development of federal common law
"where Congress vests jurisdiction in the courts and empowers them to create governing
rules of law").
9. See, e.g., Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1960)
("The phrase 'Congress shall make no law' is composed of plain words, easily
understood.").
10. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
11. Id. at 547.
12. For examples, see generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (devoting
a great deal of attention to statements made at the time of the Constitution's framing and
ratification, and to events occurring at that time); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779 (1995) (same).
13. The absence of discussion of original understanding is particularly evident in what
might be called "doctrinal" opinions, which take as their focal points previously decided
Supreme Court cases and simply "apply" the prior doctrine to the problem at hand. For
an example, see generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (formulating
the holding based upon prior Supreme Court decisions). I should note that originalism
might play a subterranean role in these cases, to the extent that the first few cases in the
doctrinal stream might themselves have relied on originalist approaches. But cf.infra text
accompanying notes 15-19 (discussing the "level of abstraction" issue in originalist
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hold of the Supreme Court is so evident that there seems little more
to say.
Except perhaps this: it seems worthwhile to distinguish between
an interpretive approach that takes original understanding seriously
and engages in detailed inquiries into the relevant historical sources,
and interpretive approaches that merely gesture in the direction of
original understanding. Supreme Court practice is dominated by the
latter nearly to the exclusion of the former, and for good reason. As
originalist scholarship developed,1 4 two related issues became
apparent. First, one could describe original understanding on various
levels of abstraction.15 Outcomes might turn, not on whether one
paid attention to original understanding, but on the level of
abstraction at which one characterized that understanding.1 6 And,
second, originalist approaches could not in themselves dictate the
level of abstraction on which originalism should operate. 7 There
were answers to the "level of abstraction" problem, but they were not
originalist answers. 8 Originalism therefore could not become the
exclusive method of interpretation. One would have to go outside
originalism to resolve the "level of abstraction" problem, and having
done so one, lost the ability to claim that originalism was the only
permissible method of constitutional interpretation. 9
The story of legislative history's role in statutory interpretation is
°
the story of two Justices, Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer.
interpretation).
14. Originalist approaches have developed more prominently in the legal academy
than in the Supreme Court.
15. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

19 (2d ed. 2002) (distinguishing between "strict" and "moderate" originalism).
16. The standard illustration of this proposition is Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954). The drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment almost certainly
did not specifically intend that the Amendment outlaw school segregation, but they used
language consistent with their intention to constitutionalize some general ideas about
racial equality with which school segregation was incompatible. For a good discussion, see
Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative ConstitutionalScholarship,90 YALE L.J. 1063,1090-92 (1981).
17. This is not to say that no one tried to find resources within originalism to define
the level of abstraction at which originalism should operate, but only that none of those
efforts were successful in the end. For a brief discussion, see Laurence H. Tribe &
Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057,
1062-63 (1990).
18. See id. at 1063 (describing the way in which the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment "appears to mark as special a quasi-metaphysical view of private property").
19. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 22 (arguing that defending originalism as
required by democracy requires a definition of democracy that itself cannot be originalist).
20. Prior to Justice Breyer's appointment in 1994, Justice Stevens had consistently
opposed Justice Scalia's approach, but with less success than he and Justice Breyer
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Justice Scalia forcefully advanced the position that legislative history
should not play any role in statutory interpretation.2 As far as one
can tell from the public record, no one else on the Court cared very
much about the issue, and a sensitive reader of Supreme Court
opinions can pick up some hints that even those Justices who were
willing to go along with Justice Scalia found his position more than a
little odd. The cases in which legislative history turns the case around
are rare indeed.2 This meant that Justice Scalia's insistence that
opinions refrain from invoking legislative history sometimes met little
resistance because it made little difference.2 13 With Justice Breyer's
arrival on the Court, Justice Scalia had a real adversary-and one
with more relevant experience to draw on.24
The effects can be traced in the Court's opinions. 25 At first the
opinions did not rely on legislative history and sometimes even stated
that it was irrelevant. 26 Then the opinions referred to legislative
history as supporting the outcome indicated by the more text-focused
methods of interpretation. These opinions set their discussion of
legislative history apart, sometimes in subsections, sometimes in
footnotes, thereby giving Justice Scalia the opportunity to concur in
the opinion except for the subsection or footnote discussing
legislative history. When Justice Scalia disagreed with the result, the
achieved after 1995.
21. For a recent statement of Justice Scalia's position, see United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738, 789 n.1 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("I would not resort to
committee reports and statements by various individuals, none of which constitutes action
taken or interpretations adopted by Congress.").
22. The relevant cases are ones in which the statutory language, taken in its "context
and read with a lawyer's attention to possible technical meanings of words sometimes used
in non-technical contexts, is ambiguous, and the "natural" reading of the statutory
language points in one direction while the legislative history on balance points in another.
23. It should be noted, though, that Justice Stevens was a consistent opponent of
Justice Scalia's position on statutory interpretation.
24. Justice Scalia had served in various positions in the executive branch, whereas
Justice Breyer had been Chief Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee and knew what
the legislative process was like from the inside. MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED:
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 66 (2005).
25. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 769 (3d ed. 2001)
("Since 1995, the Court has tended to follow the approach pressed by Justice Breyer ...
and by Justice Stevens .... ). See generally Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of
Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WiS. L. REV. 205 (2000) (providing an
overview of the development of "institutional legislative history" used by Justices Breyer
and Stevens in Supreme Court opinions beginning in 1995).
26. See, e.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 136 (1993) (relying solely on a
statute's text and rejecting recourse to policies asserted to underlie the statute); Dellmuth
v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (rejecting recourse to legislative history).
27. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 628 n.8 (1990) (confining the
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discussion of legislative history could be integrated smoothly into the

opinion, and his dissenting opinion could chastise the majority for its
use of legislative history. 28 The final stage was reached when the
Court came to a result with which Justice Scalia agreed, and the

opinion's author did not separate the discussion of legislative history
out from the rest, forcing Justice Scalia to concur only in the
29
judgment.

Those who oppose the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation regularly invoke the fabled brief that said in effect,30
"The legislative history being unclear, we turn to the statute's text.
No Supreme Court decision, even in the old days, appears to have
done that when looking at legislative history. What remains a

conceptual possibility is a case in which the text-based sources of
interpretation point reasonably clearly in one direction, while the
legislative history taken as a whole points reasonably clearly in
another. Refusing to rely on legislative history in such a case might
actually affect the outcome. But, although I am not a scholar of
statutory interpretation, I am reasonably confident that over the past
fifty years the number of cases in which this conceptual possibility

was actualized is, at most, extremely small.31

discussion of legislative history to a footnote that Justice Scalia did not join). There was
also a parallel practice in which opinions used formulations like, "[f]or those of us who
think legislative history relevant" to introduce the discussion of legislative history. Justice
Scalia could join such opinions in toto. See, e.g., United States v. Labonte, 520 U.S. 751,
774 (1997) (addressing the use of legislative history in the Court's opinion, authored by
Justice Thomas and joined by Justice Scalia, with the phrase, "the statute's legislative
");United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
history, insofar as it is relevant ...
Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988) (discussing legislative history in a unanimous
opinion authored by Justice Scalia himself: "If it is at all relevant, the legislative history
tends to subvert rather than support petitioner's thesis...").
28. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 97 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(referring to the Court's reliance on a "snippet" of legislative history); Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 730 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The neutral language of the amendment cannot possibly alter that interpretation, nor
can its legislative history be summoned forth to contradict, rather than clarify, what is in
its totality an unambiguous statutory text.").
29. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 124 S.Ct. 2466, 2484 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("[I]t is not only (as I think) improper but also quite
unnecessary to seek repeated support in the words of a Senate Committee Report ....).
30. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 31 (1997) (quoting a

brief as saying "[u]nfortunately, the legislative debates are not helpful. Thus, we turn to
the other guidepost in this difficult area, statutory language"). I note that it may be
significant that the best evidence for the eclipse of statutory language by legislative history
appears to be a brief rather than a Supreme Court opinion (although of course one might
respond that the brief writers must have picked up some indication from court opinions
that their form of argument would meet with judicial approval).
31. As I understand the literature on statutory interpretation, United Steelworkers v.
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On interpretive method, then, the Supreme Court is roughly
where it was in 1988: original understanding is relevant to
constitutional interpretation, and is one-but only one-of the
methods the Court uses; legislative history is relevant to statutory
interpretation, although it plays a somewhat smaller role today than it
did two decades ago.32
II. SUBSTANCE

I turn now to some of the substantive areas of constitutional law
the Guidelines addressed.

As indicated earlier, I consider only a

portion of the subjects the Guidelines addressed-enough, though, to
indicate the degree to which the Supreme Court over the next

decades concurred or disagreed with the positions taken in the
Guidelines.
A.

Standing

The Guidelines' discussion of standing was basically pablum-a
recitation of the holdings of relevant Supreme Court cases.33 Its
import was clear, though:
standing should not be afforded
generously. And, for a while, the Court seemed to be moving to
adopt restrictive standing rules.34 Then the movement stopped.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), is often taken to be a modern case in which the majority
conceded that the text-based sources of interpretation pointed in favor of finding that
voluntarily adopted affirmative action programs violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and relied on legislative history and purposes identified at a rather high level of
generality to justify a result contrary to that concededly suggested by the text-based
sources. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive PoliticalTheory
of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417,1517-21 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Weber case). I do not read the majority to be making the supposed concession, nor do
I believe that the argument that the text-based sources point to the anti-affirmative action
result as strongly as the literature suggests.
32. Eskridge et al. provide a slightly different summary, different, in my view,
primarily in tone from mine:
We do not think the Supreme Court has entirely returned to the pre-Scalia days
.... First, the text is now, more than it was 20 or 30 years ago, the central inquiry
.... Second, the "contextual" evidence the Court is interested in is now statutory
as much as or more than just historical context.... Third, the Court will still look
at contextual evidence and is very interested in the public law background of the
statute.
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 25, at 770-71.
33. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 16-20.
34. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (denying
standing because the relief sought by plaintiffs, namely an order requiring those who
caused past environmental damage to pay a civil penalty into a government fund, would
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Today, standing as a legal doctrine will rarely impede a well-advised
litigant seeking to challenge almost any statute enacted by Congress
or action taken by an executive official 3 5-and, more to the point of
the present discussion, will do so no more frequently than would have
occurred in the 1980s.
Standing issues arise in two contexts: where the litigant relies on
the general law of standing, which requires a litigant to suffer a
cognizable injury caused by the challenged action that can be
remedied by the judicial order the litigant seeks, 36 and where the
litigant relies on a specific grant of standing to him or her (usually as a
citizen) by Congress. The restrictiveness of standing doctrine in the
first category will depend on the definition the Court gives to injury
and the scope it gives to causation. Allen v. Wright,37 decided before
the Guidelines were written, used narrow versions of both concepts.
It held that injury to what the Court called "dignitary interests" is not
sufficient to support standing, and that injuries flowing from decisions
by private actors responding to prices affected by government policies
are not caused by those policies in a constitutionally meaningful
sense.

38

The Court has, however, recognized a rather wide range of other

not adequately address the alleged harm); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
566, 578 (1992) (denying standing for wildlife enthusiasts to challenge government actions
overseas as harmful to endangered species despite plaintiffs' asserted plans to visit
affected areas and despite a federal statute conferring standing on "any person").
35. Three qualifications to this statement are appropriate. First, not every individual
litigant will have standing to challenge any particular statute or executive action. But, a
group (interest or otherwise) seeking to challenge a statute or executive action should be
able to identify someone who will have standing and can challenge the government
conduct on their behalf. Second, sometimes timing considerations-often discussed under
the heading of ripeness-will mean that challenges will have to be brought later rather
than sooner. From the point of view of someone interested in judicial supervision of
legislation and executive administration, timing questions, while of some interest, play a
secondary role to standing. Third, there is a residual aspect of standing as a technique
used to avoid deciding contentious or particularly difficult constitutional questions. Here,
standing is less a doctrine than a technique of judicial administration or politics. It
remains available to the Court, and the only question-to which there can be no general
answer-is whether today's Court is more willing, or less willing, than earlier ones to use
this avoidance technique. This is, though, a question of judicial politics rather than a
question about constitutional law. For a recent example, see Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2305 (2004), which dismissed a challenge to the words
"under God" in the pledge of allegiance for lack of standing rather than ruling on the
merits of the claim.
36. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City
of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993) (summarizing these standing requirements).
37. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
38. Id. at 756-59.
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injuries, including harm to the environment, aesthetic injuries,39 and
impairment of public access to information,4 0 as constitutionally

cognizable injuries. The definition of "injury," then, has not been
particularly narrow. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife41 found that the

litigants before the Court lacked standing to challenge decisions said
to adversely affect the preservation of endangered species outside the
United States, but with an analysis that indicated that minor changes

in the litigants' position-in particular, allegations that the litigants
had actually purchased airplane tickets to observe the endangered
species-would have been sufficient to support standing.4
And
Lujan was the high water mark of restrictive standing rules. 43 The

causation requirement is also not particularly restrictive, except with
respect to the narrow category of claims of injury flowing from
government policies that affect market prices, the private response to
which adversely affects a constitutionally cognizable interest."
Obviously, litigants can sometimes be trapped by surprising
applications of standing doctrine, as those in Lujan might have been,
but the doctrine in itself does not pose serious barriers.
The Supreme Court struggled to develop a coherent doctrine
dealing with the second category of standing cases, where Congress
specifically confers standing on a litigant. Justice Scalia seemed to get
the Court to agree that a statute conferring standing adds nothing to
the analysis of injury, causation, and redressability that would occur
in the absence of such a statute, a5 and gained four votes for the

position that such a statute unconstitutionally interfered with the
39. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) ("Aesthetic and
environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the
quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared
by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process.").
40. This interest is the basis for allowing standing in ordinary Freedom of Information
Act cases, none of which have questioned the standing of those requesting information.
41. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
42. Id. at 564, 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2000)
(qualifying the restrictive approach of Lujan by allowing South Carolina residents to bring
a claim of a violation of the Clean Water Act, basing standing on plaintiffs averred use of
the affected area for recreational activities).
44. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-61 (1984) (denying standing to parties
challenging the IRS's grant of tax exempt status to some racially discriminatory schools
because "[t]he line of causation between [the IRS's] conduct and desegregation of
respondent's schools [was] attenuated at best").
45. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-78 (holding that the "cases and controversies requirement
of Article III of the Constitution mandates that these elements be present to establish
standing, and that Congress may not expand the Court's power to hear cases beyond the
scope of Article III").
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president's obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. But, in the end, neither position could be sustained. The
Court had to acknowledge that Congress could create standing by
creating new substantive rights, an insight that went back to the
1970s.4 6 And, having done so, it could not explain why one could not
infer from the statute conferring standing the new substantive right
Congress had created. Directly faced with the question of citizen
standing pursuant to a specific statute, the Court found such standing
consistent with the Constitution.4 7
In short, there are restrictive doctrines out there, which have not
been expressly repudiated, but those doctrines are in severe tension
with the analysis and holdings of more recent cases. The Supreme
Court has not, of course, recognized the pure public action in which
any person can challenge any governmental action. Neither did any
Court in the past. Instead, the Court has constructed a doctrine of
standing that comes quite close to authorizing the pure public
action-indeed, perhaps closer today than in the 1970s and 1980s.
B.

Unenumerated ConstitutionalRights

Some conservative opposition to Roe v. Wade41 was based on the
view that the fetus had a right to life protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This view could take several forms. The strongest form
argued that the unborn person had a right to life protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, that the woman bearing the unborn person
had no constitutionally protected interest in choice at all, and that the
government therefore had a constitutional obligation to enact and
enforce restrictive abortion laws.49 A slightly weaker version
accepted the proposition that the woman had a constitutionally
protected right to choose, which nonetheless had to be balanced
46. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (holding that
the Fair Housing Act properly confers standing to sue on any resident of a housing
complex who alleges injury from racial discrimination in the management of the complex).
47. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (holding that the Federal
Election Campaign Act properly conferred the right of any voter to file a complaint with
the Federal Election Commission upon a mere belief that the act had been violated).
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

49. See The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1065-69 (1982) (Sup. Docs.
No. Y4.J89/2:J-97-16/v.1-2) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of John C. Willke, M.D.,
President of the National Right to Life Committee); Charles E. Rice, Abortion,
Euthanasia,and the Need to Build a New "Culture of Life," 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS

& PUB. POL'Y 497, 497-503 (1998); Robert Bork & Nathan Schleuter, Constitutional
Persons: An Exchange on Abortion, FIRST THINGS: MONTHLY J. RELIGION & PUB. LIFE,

28, 29-33 (Jan. 2003).
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against the fetus's right to life, and that the Constitution struck the
balance in favor of the fetus, with the consequence, again, that states
were required to enact and enforce restrictive abortion laws." A still
weaker version was that women's right to choose and the fetus's right
to life had to be balanced, that the Constitution did not itself dictate
what the outcome of the balancing was, but that the Constitution did
allow states to decide as a matter of policy to strike the balance in
favor of the fetus's right to life.
Each of these analyses pushed constitutional interpretation in a
direction the Guidelines opposed. As a purely textual matter, one
could locate the fetus's right to life in either of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantees that no "person" could be deprived of life
without due process of law or be denied the equal protection of the
laws.5
Neither course under the Fourteenth Amendment was
entirely satisfactory from an originalist point of view. The Guidelines'
position on judicial "creation" of fundamental rights counseled
against relying on the Due Process Clause to generate a substantive
right to life.52 The equal protection argument might have made more
headway:
if fetuses were persons within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, one could contend that a fetus was denied
the protection of the law equal to that provided to other persons if
the state did not enact and enforce laws protecting fetuses against the
deprivation of their lives equivalent to the laws protecting adults
against murder. That, though, was precisely the problem. As a
matter of history, laws against abortion never treated it as an offense
as serious as murder.5 3 In light of that history, the equal protection
argument for the right to life generated results that were
unsustainable analytically (not to mention politically).
The Guidelines took a different tack. Instead of challenging Roe
v. Wade for striking the wrong balance of constitutionally protected
rights, they denied that there were any rights in the premises. 4 The
challenge took the form of generally rejecting the proposition that the
Constitution authorized the courts to protect any rights other than
50. See Hearings, supra note 49, at 775-77 (statement of David Wilkinson, Attorney
General of Utah); Stephen H. Galebach, A Human Life Statute, HUM. LIFE REV. 3, 23-24
(Winter 1981).
51. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
52. Cf. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 80 ("[A]ttorneys... should attack arguments...

for creating new fundamental rights not found in the Constitution.").
53.
54.

See EVA. R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, AND THE COURTS 13-15 (1987).
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 82 ("The right of privacy cases [including Roe] ...

provide other examples of judicial creation of 'fundamental' rights not found in the
Constitution.").
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those specifically enumerated in the document.5 5 As the Guidelines
indicated, Bowers v. Hardwick56 came close to endorsing the

proposition that the courts should not protect unenumerated rights
with its statement that "(tihe Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or57 no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution.
Notwithstanding Bowers, the Supreme Court has continued to

endorse a jurisprudence of unenumerated rights. Conservatives tried
to persuade the Court to overrule Roe v. Wade, but they failed.58
Moving in the other direction, the Court overruled Bowers without
any concession to the marginal legitimacy, as Bowers had put it, of

protecting unenumerated rights.5 9
The remaining question was whether the jurisprudence of
unenumerated rights could somehow be limited and its advances
halted. For a moment it seemed as if the Guidelines' approach might
have succeeded. Bowers did little to develop a strong analytic
structure of the sort the Guidelines sought. Justice White's opinion
merely identified two standards that the Court had used in the past to
identify unenumerated rights' and asserted that neither one would
"extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of

consensual sodomy."61 The difficulty was that each (or both) of the
two standards might yield different conclusions depending on how the
claimed unenumerated right was characterized.

When the Court later rejected one substantial effort to enforce
an unenumerated right in Washington v. Glucksberg,62 it seemed to
have developed a suitable doctrinal approach. The case involved the
55. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 79 ("The federal courts are not free to create
fundamental rights not specified in the Constitution."). Here the Guidelines' concerns for
substance merged with its concerns about appropriate interpretive method.
56. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
57. Id. at 194.
58. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992)
("After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles
of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.").
59. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
60. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92. According to Justice White's analysis, unenumerated
rights are "those fundamental liberties that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'
such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,' " or "those
liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' " Id. (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937); Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977)).
61. Id. at 192.
62. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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claim that individuals had a right to obtain assistance in committing
suicide.63 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court, the Court's unenumerated rights cases had two key
components. First, unenumerated rights had to be "objectively,
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' "I and, more
important, the claimed right had to be carefully described.6" The
"careful description" requirement, it seemed, would ensure that the
right would not be described on such a high level of abstraction that it
could be found deeply rooted in our traditions, in the way that a
generic right to liberty might be.66
This method of identifying unenumerated rights seemed to place
substantial limits on the Court's power to protect novel
unenumerated rights. Yet, its genesis suggests that the Court's
approach was less stringent than it seemed. The "careful description"
requirement was actually a watered down version of the more
structured test proposed by Justice Scalia and, at the time, endorsed
According to Justice Scalia, the
only by the Chief Justice.67
should
be at "the most specific level
description of the claimed right
at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified."6 Notably, Justice Scalia's test is
more precise than the "careful description" test.6 9
The apparent victory for a Guidelines-like approach lasted no
more than a year. The next term the Court decided an obscure case,
County of Sacramento v. Lewis.7" The plaintiff there sought damages
for injuries sustained in a high-speed automobile chase, arguing that
the Constitution protected people against injuries resulting from
outrageous government conduct." Although the Court rejected the
63. Id. at 708.
64. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503).
65. Id. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
66. The issues associated with the problem of the level of abstraction in the context of
substantive due process are obviously quite similar to those associated with the related
problem in the context of originalism. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
67. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
68. Id.
69. After all, one can describe a right to liberty quite carefully at a high level of
generality. For a useful demonstration (not, I think, intended as such by its author) of the
flexibility of the Glucksberg test, see Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?,88 MINN.
L. REV. 1140, 1164 (2004) (arguing that the description of the right in Lawrence was
"broader ... than that conceived in Hardwick, to be sure, but it is hardly unlimited"). If
the "careful description" requirement means only that "unlimited" rights are ruled out,
the requirement will never do much work.
70. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
71. Lewis was killed in the chase; he had been a passenger on a motorcycle whose
driver attempted to evade the police. Id. at 837.
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claim that Lewis had been the victim of such conduct, it did assert
that the Constitution protected individuals against government
behavior that shocked the conscience, even if the government
behavior did not fall within any of the rights enumerated in the
Constitution: "[Flor half a century now we have spoken of the
cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the
conscience."7 2
The standing cases at least created some doctrinal possibilities
for restrictive rulings in the future. The unenumerated rights cases
did not. Roe v. Wade remained on the books, a model for the
identification of unenumerated constitutional rights. The limiting
approach taken in the assisted-suicide case had no staying power
whatsoever. Today the jurisprudence of unenumerated rights is
perhaps even more vigorous than it was two decades ago.
C.

PropertyRights in ConstitutionalLaw

The revival of constitutional protection of property rights has
been reasonably successful.7 3 Formal doctrine has reached the point
where those who invoke property rights against government
regulations are unlikely to prevail in the end. Yet, the Court has
given such litigants resources whose effect is to increase the
government's cost of defending regulations against challengethereby deterring government entities with constrained budgets from
imposing the regulations in the first place. Here the new judicial
center may have prevailed doctrinally but failed practically. And, as
in nearly every other area I consider in this Article, the Court's
property rights doctrines might be used in the future far more
expansively than they have been so far.
A comprehensive survey of constitutional property rights would
be exceedingly complex, and I oversimplify for expository purposes.
72. Id. at 846. The majority's approach elicited an unsurprisingly harsh response from
Justice Scalia, who noted the difference between the approach taken in Lewis and that
taken in Glucksburg:
The atavistic methodology that Justice Souter announces for the Court is the very
same methodology that the Court called atavistic when it was proffered by Justice

Souter in Glucksberg. ... [Today's opinion resuscitates the ne plus ultra, the
Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, the Celophane of subjectivity, th' ol'
"shocks-the-conscience" test.
Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
73. As noted above, supra note 7, the
questions, probably because those questions
activities, not only in regulating property
construction and the like.

(footnote omitted).
Guidelines did not deal with property rights
implicated a wide range of the government's
but in acquiring property for purposes of
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The key issues center on when a government regulation, or a
condition required to obtain the government's permission to engage
in a regulated activity, amounts to a taking of property for which
compensation is required. The black-letter rules are that a regulation
effectuating a permanent physical occupation of property requires
compensation,74 and a regulation that diminishes the value of

property requires compensation only when, on balance, the impact on
private property is substantially more significant than the public
benefit the regulation confers.75

The Court began with what turned out to be one of the easiest
cases.

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission76 involved

a

requirement imposed by the Coastal Commission on homeowners
who sought to demolish an existing structure and build a larger home
on the state's shoreline.77 As a condition for obtaining a building

permit, the Coastal Commission required the homeowners to allow
the public to walk across a strip of their beachfront property. 78 Had

the Commission simply required public access to the beach, there
would clearly have been a permanent physical occupation of the

property requiring compensation. According to the Court, the fact
that the access came by means of a condition on obtaining a building
permit did not matter, because the connection between the activity

for which the permit was required-the construction of a larger
house-and public access to the beach was too attenuated.79 A later
case held that the standard for determining when a condition was
sufficiently connected to the permit's purposes was "rough
proportionality.""
In practice, this standard means that the government must be
74. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
The cases mostly involve real property, but conceptually the rules apply to intellectual
property as well.
75. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922). Not surprisingly, only a
small number of regulations fall into this second category.
76. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
77. Id. at 828.
78. Id. at 827.
79. Id. at 837. The Coastal Commission argued that the new house would block the
public's view of the beach, thereby limiting the public's ability to learn that there were
indeed public beaches on either side of the new house, and that giving the public the right
to walk along the beach would somehow offset the reduced visual information about
beach access. Id. at 835. I find it difficult even to put the Coastal Commission's argument
in a form that makes modest sense. The Court later referred to the Coastal Commission's
argument as a "gimmick[]." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994).
80. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (imposing an additional requirement that "the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development").
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prepared to produce studies-ecological, economic, and the likethat demonstrate the requisite connection.8 1 For political reasons
governments often do develop such studies, but now they must be
sure that the studies can also satisfy the courts.8 2 Many of these
studies will do so, but only at an increased cost which reduces the
supply of regulations, in turn.
The other important branch of doctrine involves what has come
to be known as the "denominator problem." 3 It arises in limited
form in ordinary real property cases, but its subversive implications
become apparent when those cases are placed in the larger
conceptual framework of property law. Complete deprivation of the
right to use property requires compensation.' To know when such a
deprivation has occurred we need to know what the property is.
Consider a regulation that completely precludes a property owner
from using ten percent of her real property. The issue is whether the
regulation constitutes a complete deprivation of her right to use that
portion of her property, or merely a diminution of her property's
value from one hundred percent to ninety percent.
From the outset of the Court's foray into property rights this
problem identifying the denominator for determining when a
complete deprivation occurred was a serious one. As Justice Stevens
put it, "A landowner whose property is diminished in value ninetyfive percent recovers nothing, while an owner whose property is
diminished one hundred percent recovers the land's full value."' 5 The
problem becomes even more serious if we move away from the
conception of property as physical things to the modern idea of
property as a bundle of rights. When a regulation takes one stick out
of the bundle, the issue becomes whether there is a total deprivation
81. See, e.g., Brenda Jones Quick, Dolan v. City of Tigarc- The Case that Nobody
Won, 1995 DETROIT C.L. REV. 79, 103 (1995) (reporting an interview with a city mayor
who noted that his city would now have to pay for impact studies).
82. See generally Kathryn C. Plunkett, Comment, Local Environmental Impact
Review: IntegratingLand Use and Environmental Planning Through Local Environmental
Impact Reviews, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 211 (2002) (describing such studies and their
uses).
83. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)
("[One of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property 'whose
value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.' " (quoting Frank 1. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967)).
84. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,426 (1982).
85. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1064 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Actually, the first landowner might recover something, depending on how the balancing
the Court called for comes out. That, however, is independent of the denominator
problem that Justice Stevens was identifying.
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of that property right (of course it is) or only perhaps a small
reduction in the size of the bundle (of course it is).
One apparent solution to the denominator problem could be
found in the balancing branch of property rights law. There the
courts are supposed to take "distinct investment-backed
How, though, were a person's
expectations" into account.8 6
"expectations" determined?
In particular, were a person's
expectations determined by the state of the law at the time she
acquired the property at issue? If so, the constitutional limits on
property rights, going forward, would be slight indeed. The Court
waved its hands at the problem, saying that the mere existence of a
regulation at the time property was acquired did not eliminate the
need to balance the regulation's adverse impact on the new owner's
rights.87 The Court's opinion was notably uninformative on exactly
how the regulation's existence should be placed into the balance.
Justice O'Connor offered a particularly incoherent dissertation on the
question.88 But, as John Echeverria, a defender of state land-use
regulations put it, the Court's decision meant that "most longestablished environmental and land use regulations will be largely
immune from takings challenges. '"89

In the sense that regulations remain largely immune from
successfully

litigated

challenges,

the

Court's

property

rights

jurisprudence is not much different from what it had been a
generation earlier, when regulations were similarly immune from
such challenges. Yet the cost of winning the cases is undoubtedly
greater today than it had been in the prior period. Here the impact of

legal doctrine "on the ground" might be more substantial than the
analytics of the doctrine standing alone would suggest. Of course, the

flexibility and incoherence of the Court's analysis makes anything
86. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
87. Palazzollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
88. Justice O'Connor stated:
[Olur decision today does not remove the regulatory backdrop against which
owner takes title to property from the purview of the Penn Central inquiry.
simply restores balance to that inquiry. Courts properly consider the effect
existing regulations under the rubric of investment-backed expectations
determining whether a compensable taking has occurred.

an
It
of
in

Id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring) Justice Scalia offered a cogent criticism, arguing
that "the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title ... should have
no bearing upon the determination of whether the restriction is so substantial as to
concurring) (internal citations omitted).
constitute a taking." Id. at 637 (Scalia, J.,
89. John D. Echeverria, A PreliminaryAssessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31
ENVTL L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,112, at 11,114 (Sept. 2001).
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possible in the future.
D.

CongressionalPower

The Guidelines foreshadowed the Supreme Court's so-called
Federalism Revolution in an extensive discussion of "the limited
power granted to the federal government."9 The Court has indeed
invalidated federal statutes because they exceeded the power of the
national government, as it had not done for a generation before the
1990s. Even so, the invalidations so far have a strikingly limited
scope. Furthermore the doctrines they articulate seem ill-suited to
substantially transforming the regulatory reach of the national
government. The Court's federalism cases are so familiar that I will
simply summarize the high points.
(1) Congress'spower to regulate interstate commerce.91 Congress
cannot justify regulation of non-commercial activities on the ground
that the effects of those activities, when taken in the aggregate, have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. But, Congress can regulate
a commercial activity that itself has no significant effect on interstate
commerce if that activity, taken together with similar ones, has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. In addition, Congress can
regulate the instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce,
and such regulations can include a prohibition on the possession and
use of items that at one point crossed state lines and were, in that
sense, once "in"interstate commerce. 92
(2) Congress's power to enforce constitutional rights protected
against the states by the Fourteenth and other Amendments.93
Congress may not itself "enforce" constitutional rights other than
those the courts would identify. But, Congress has the power to
devise remedies for violations of judicially identified rights that go
beyond the elimination of only such violations by developing
remedies that are congruent with and proportional to the record of
actual violations. The standards of congruence and proportionality
90. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 36-69.
91. This paragraph summarizes the holdings in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Here and in the succeeding
paragraphs, including citations to the places where the Court develops the holdings would
be unnecessarily obtrusive.
92. Or, at least, the Supreme Court has not indicated that these two justifications for
regulation are now unavailable in some circumstances, and dicta in its decisions seem to
indicate that they are available.
93. This paragraph summarizes the holdings of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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are easier to satisfy when the underlying rights violations either are
fundamental rights or are designed to benefit groups whose members
have suffered substantial discrimination in the past or who have
restricted access to the political process to obtain legislative relief
from persisting discrimination. The effect of these rules is that
Congress can sometimes impose obligations on state and local
governments that do more than eliminate unconstitutional actions.
(3) Congress's power to utilize institutions of state and local
government to implement nationalpolicy.94 Congress can insist that

state courts enforce national laws but cannot "commandeer" state
and local legislative and executive officials to implement national

policy. This "anti-commandeering" principle rests not on any specific
constitutional text but rather on principles of state sovereignty that
are implicit in the nation's institutions.95

The scope of the "anti-

commandeering" principle is unclear. It is in some tension with the
principles authorizing Congress to force state and local governments

to comply with national rights-protective legislation, at least to the
extent that such legislation goes beyond the elimination of
One possibility is that the "antiunconstitutional actions.

commandeering" principle applies to the congressional powers
enumerated in Article I, but not to congressional powers embodied in

constitutional amendments whose very purpose, the Supreme Court
has told us, was to work a substantial change in the structure of
national and state power.96
Limitations on Congress's power to require monetary
(4)
remedies for violations of national law.97 Congress can require states
to pay damages for violations of rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment but not for violations of national statutes that rest on

94. This paragraph summarizes the holdings of New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
95. The Guidelines rest the constitutional protection of state sovereignty in the Tenth
Amendment, whose text-not quoted fully in the Guidelines-is unsuitable for the
purpose. See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 54-55. The standard citation for this
proposition is United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The [Tenth A]mendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.").
96. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972) (referring to "the basic alteration
in our federal system wrought in the Reconstruction era through federal legislation and
constitutional amendment"). One difficulty with this interpretation is that the "basic
alteration" would appear to be in the structure of relations between the nation and the
states as a whole, not simply their relations with respect to the rights created by the
Reconstruction amendments.
97. This paragraph summarizes the holding of and statements regarding other
remedies in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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Congress's powers under Article V' Congress can require states to
comply with the substantive obligations imposed by statutes enacted
pursuant to those powers, unless the statutes are unconstitutional for
reasons discussed above. The obligations can be enforced by actions
by the national government. More important, individuals facing
future injury from state violations of national law can obtain
injunctions against those violations by suing, in their official
capacities, the individuals in state government charged with
complying with national law.
What, then, is the overall effect of the Court's new federalism
doctrine? Consider first the private economy. The Court has given
no hint that it intends to limit in any significant way the power of the
national government to regulate activities fairly characterized as
commercial. On the margins, the Court might limit the application of
some environmental laws, perhaps through constitutional rulings but
more likely through statutory interpretation influenced by
constitutional concerns. 99 But nothing in existing doctrine threatens

the laws characteristic of the modern regulatory state: environmental,
occupational safety and health, and other extensive regulatory
schemes.
Second, the Court has not indicated that Congress lacks the
power to require state and local governments to comply with general
regulatory requirements applicable equally to their commercial
activities and the commercial activities of private actors. It has
restricted the remedies available when states fail to comply with those
commands, but prospective relief-even at the behest of adversely
Third, the Court has
affected individuals-remains available.
indicated that Congress has the power to compel state and local
governments to comply with regulatory requirements even when
commercial activities are not involved, when the activities implicate
substantive constitutional rights, or when the regulations seek to
benefit groups who are protected more than minimally against
government discrimination. These are large categories, though not of
course all-encompassing ones.
Finally, the Court has invoked its anti-commandeering principle
98. This restriction does not apply to remedies to be obtained by local governments.
State law determines whether a government agency is an arm of the state protected
against these remedies or is instead is a local government subject to monetary liability.
99. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (reading the statute at issue "to avoid the significant constitutional
and federalism questions raised by respondents' interpretation"); Jones v. United States,
529 U.S. 848 (2000) (construing a federal arson statute narrowly to avoid potential
constitutional violations in a broader reading).
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only twice. That principle needs to be fleshed out before we can
really know what it means. In particular, it is at least conceptually
possible that the Court could apply the anti-commandeering principle
to all national statutes imposing regulatory requirements on state and
local governments. I think this highly unlikely, and that the real issue
is identifying the set of national statutes to which the principle will
apply. The Court's early stab at the problem involved identifying
integral or traditional governmental activities."
That task proved
impossible, to the point where the Court in an opinion by Justice
O'Connor in 2004 unanimously rejected the proposition that a legal
rule could be predicated on determining whether such a
10 1
Printz v. United States10 2
governmental function was affected.
emphasized the novelty of the regulatory requirement there, 13 and
perhaps novelty will come to identify the set of regulations to which
the anti-commandeering principle applies, notwithstanding the
obvious manipulability of that standard. 1"
Real revolutionaries would laugh at the accomplishments of the
Federalism Revolution. The cases are available for more substantial
development in the future, but for now the Court has moved back
only inches from where the Warren Court left it. For all practical
purposes, the expansive national government that is the constitutional
legacy of the New Deal and the Great Society remains with us.
CONCLUSION

My theme has been simple and boringly repeated.
The
Guidelines envisioned a constitutional law radically different from the
constitutional law of the 1970s. For a while some Court initiatives
seemed to portend judicial endorsement of a similar vision. Those
initiatives eventually failed, leaving the law pretty much as it had
been. "Pretty much" is not "the same as," of course, and there is no
100. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
101. Justice O'Connor stated:
We rejected as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice" a rule of state
immunity from federal regulation under the Tenth Amendment that turned on
whether a particular state government function was "integral" or "traditional."
CFTB has convinced us of neither the relative soundness nor the relative
practicality of adopting a similar distinction here.
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 498 (2003) (quoting Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985)) (internal citations omitted).
102. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
103. Id. at 918.
104. Akin, it should be noted, to the problem of the level of generality in identifying
unenumerated constitutional rights. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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doubt that legislators can no longer be confident that some of the
things that would have easily passed muster in the 1970s will do so
today. Most of them will, but after more effort than would have been
required earlier. And, some of the Court's restrictive doctrines have
been ignored or restricted but not formally repudiated. They remain
available for a future Court to take up and expand. For the present,
though, Pete Townsend and The Who appear to be pretty much
correct: "Meet the new boss, same as the old boss." ' 5

105. THE WHO, Won't Get Fooled Again, on WHO'S NEXT (MCA Records, remastered
1995).
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